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A Winning Combination?  
Economic Theory Meets Sports
By Kristie M. Engemann and Michael T. Owyang
research
U
nlike researchers in the natural sci-
ences, economists often lack the ability 
to conduct laboratory or controlled experi-
ments to test theories or make inference.  
In recent years, economists have begun to 
study “natural experiments”—naturally 
occurring events that provide a researcher 
with a basis to analyze outcomes within a 
clearly defined setting.  One such artificial 
laboratory that economists have discovered 
is sports.  Economists have used data from 
sports to examine such diverse issues as  
(1) risk behavior, (2) market efficiency,  
(3) market power and (4) discrimination.
Risk Behavior:  Does Maximization  
Predict Coaches’ Decisions?
A basic assumption in economic models is 
that, in competitive markets, firms maximize 
profits.  In the sports world, such maximiza-
tion might be seen as a coach maximizing his 
team’s chance of winning.  Economist David 
Romer tested whether coaches make the opti-
mal choice in a fourth-down situation in the 
National Football League (NFL).  He argued 
that this analysis should be similar to the 
firm maximization model because winning 
is highly valued, coaches have pressure to win 
due to the competitive nature of the job and 
teams can learn from past experiences.
Romer studied all of the regular-season 
NFL games during the 1998, 1999 and 2000 
seasons, but used only the first quarter of 
the games in his analysis; later in the game, 
teams may change their strategy based 
on the score.  Therefore, the first quarter 
should yield the best insight as to whether 
teams maximize their chances of winning.  
Romer analyzed the expected payoff from 
going for a first down on the fourth down 
at every point on the field versus kicking 
the ball (punting or a field goal attempt).  
His analysis compared the expected values 
of the outcome of a play, as well as the 
expected value of leaving the opponent  
with the ball at that spot on the field.
After taking all results into account, he 
estimated that teams are better off going 
for a first down than punting if they have 
fewer than four yards to go in their half of 
the field; if they have fewer than 6.5 yards 
to go on the other team’s 45-yard line; and 
if they have fewer than 9.8 yards to go on 
the other team’s 33-yard line, at which point 
teams are within typical field-goal range.  
After the other team’s 21-yard line, the value 
of going for it frequently outweighs the 
expected value of kicking a field goal, and at 
the 5-yard line, the team is always better off 
going for the first down or touchdown.
How did Romer’s predictions compare 
with actual plays in the NFL games?  In 
situations where teams were expected to  
be better off kicking the ball on fourth 
down, they went for a first down less than  
1 percent of the time.  However, when teams 
were expected to be better off going for 
a first down, they kicked the ball almost 
90 percent of the time.  Romer estimated 
that if a team optimized in these situations 
throughout the whole game, it would win 
one more game every three seasons.  
Romer surmised that coaches’ previous 
experiences might cause more conserva-
tive decisions than one would predict using 
standard assumptions about optimizing 
behavior.  Alternatively, a coach’s objective 
might be more complicated than simply 
choosing plays that would result in the 
highest expected outcome.  For instance, 
he might view activities that decrease the 
chance of winning (e.g., a failed first-down 
attempt) more negatively than he views a 
successful activity positively, which could 
stem from fan or owner preferences.
Risk Behavior:  Does Game Theory  
Predict Player Behavior?
What happens when only two players are 
involved rather than entire teams?  Econo-
mists Pierre-André Chiappori, Steven Levitt 
and Timothy Groseclose tested whether 
kickers and goalies used mixed strategies 
(i.e., chose strategies at random) to optimize 
their chances of being successful during 
penalty kicks in soccer.  Even though soccer 
is a team sport, the penalty kicks involve 
just those two players and thus allow for 
a test of economic game theory.  For each 
penalty kick, the kicker should maximize his 
chance of scoring, while the goalie should 
maximize his chance of preventing a score.
The authors studied all penalty kicks over 
a two-year period in the elite French league 
and over a three-year period in the elite Ital-
ian league.  For each penalty kick, they had 
In situations where teams were expected to be better off 
kicking the ball on fourth down, they went for a first down 
less than 1 percent of the time.  however, when teams were 
expected to be better off going for a first down, they kicked 
the ball almost 90 percent of the time.  
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direction the kicker kicked (right, left or cen-
ter) and which foot he used, and the direc-
tion the goalie jumped (right, left or center).  
Due to the high speed of the ball, each player 
must decide which direction to kick/jump 
before the other player makes a move.  
The authors contended that a goalie’s 
strategy should depend on the kicker’s 
past kicks, but a kicker’s strategy should be 
independent of the goalie.  In the authors’ 
sample, when both players chose the kicker’s 
natural side (which is the left side in most 
cases because the kickers usually kick 
with their right foot), the kicker scored 64 
percent of the time, and when both chose 
the kicker’s non-natural side, the kicker 
scored about 44 percent of the time.  When 
the goalie jumped to the wrong side, the 
kicker scored 94 percent of the time when he 
kicked to his natural side and 89 percent of 
the time when he kicked to his non-natural 
side.  Obvious from these data is that kick-
ers are substantially more successful when 
kicking to their natural side.  
The authors showed that, over their 
sample of 459 penalty kicks, the players 
used mixed strategies that one would expect 
in order to maximize behavior.  Indeed, a 
kicker went to the center more often than 
the goalie did (17 percent versus 2 percent), 
and a kicker went to his natural side less 
often than the goalie did (45 percent versus 
57 percent).  Both players were more likely 
to go to the kicker’s natural side than his 
non-natural side, and the case where they 
simultaneously went to the kicker’s natural 
side was the most common (25 percent),  
followed by the goalie jumping to the 
kicker’s natural side but the kicker going  
to the opposite (21 percent). 
Based on all of these results, Chiappori, 
Levitt and Groseclose could not rule out 
that soccer players successfully optimize 
their behavior during penalty kicks.
Do Markets Work?
Many aspects of the sports labor mar-
ket have been analyzed.  The competitive 
environment of sports provides a setting 
in which one would expect merit-based 
outcomes to prevail.
Along this line, researchers Edward Fee, 
Charles Hadlock and Joshua Pierce studied 
promotions among coaches in the NFL.  
The authors assessed whether promotions  
within teams were based on different 
criteria than promotions from outside.  
The researchers focused on promotions of 
offensive and defensive coordinators (level 2 
coaches) to head coaches (level 1 coaches).
Examining data for NFL coaches from 
1970 to 2001, the authors used a team’s 
winning percentage as a measure of team 
performance.  The authors used points 
scored for offensive coordinators and 
points allowed for defensive coor-
dinators as a measure of individual 
performance.  In assessing promo-
tions of level 2 coaches to head 
coach on another team, the  
hiring decision depended on 
individual performance rather 
than team performance.  In 
contrast, both team perfor-
mance and individual perfor-
mance mattered for promotion 
to head coach on the same team.  A strong 
team performance actually decreased the 
likelihood of such a promotion, mostly 
because teams with winning records were 
less likely to replace their head coach.  After 
controlling for the team, the highest indi-
vidual performers were more likely to be 
promoted.  However, the two effects essen-
tially canceled each other out, leaving virtu-
ally no effect of individual performance on 
internal promotions.
Fee, Hadlock and Pierce likened this 
situation to top management at firms.
1  
For senior management excluding CEOs, 
strong performers are more likely to obtain 
the position of CEO at a different firm 
rather than their own firm due to “slot 
constraints.”  The authors’ findings do not 
support the theory that internal promotions 
serve as incentives for the best performers, 
at least not for top-level positions.
Market Power and the Labor Market
A sports league can be viewed as a mon-
opsony—there is one buyer but many sellers 
of a product (players’ services, in this case).  
A sports league, such as Major League Base-
ball (MLB), has market power because it 
can pay players less than their contribution 
to the team generates in revenue.  However, 
the league cannot exercise as much market 
power for players who are eligible for salary 
arbitration or free agency.
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salary arbitration on salary and contract 
length, economist Lawrence Kahn looked at 
all players from 1987 to 1990.  He obtained 
data on each player’s salary, contract, total 
compensation, performance statistics and 
local demographics (e.g., population and 
per capita income of the team’s metropoli-
tan statistical area) and performed separate 
analyses on nonpitchers and pitchers.  Com-
pared to players with less than three years of 
service, free agents earned about five times 
more each year and players with five years 
of service earned between five and six times 
more each year during this time period.
The table shows the results of Kahn’s 
analysis after controlling for performance 
statistics, years of experience, etc.  The top 
panel shows that players with arbitration 
and free agency earned higher annual sala-
ries than players with fewer than three years 
of service.  A notable exception is white 
pitchers who were free agents—they earned 
roughly the same amount as those with 
fewer than three years of service.  However, 
free agents were the only group with consis-
tently longer contract length, which would 
affect total compensation (bottom panel) 
perhaps more than annual salary alone.
Kahn argued that his results are in line 
with free agents’ willingness to accept 
a lower annual salary for the insurance 
that comes with longer contracts.  He also 
argued that the significant effect of free 
agency on contract length shows that teams 
are willing to sign longer contracts only at  
Comparison group is players with less than three years of serviCe
Nonpitchers Pitchers
Whites Nonwhites Whites Nonwhites
Annual compensation (% difference)
players with:
      3 or 4 years of service 36 43 36 28
      5 years of service 48 44 28 53
      free agency 44 35 4 31
Total compensation (% difference)
players with:
      3 or 4 years of service 36 36 34 27
      5 years of service 62 56 54 76
      free agency 68 59 51 66
sourCe: Kahn (1993).
AnnuAL AnD ToTAL CoMPensATion DiffeRenCes foR MLB GRouPs the possibility of losing a player, thus avoid-
ing a “bidding war” with other teams.
Discrimination in Pay
Many economists have studied discrimi-
nation in the labor market, including the 
sports labor market.  Researchers Kahn 
and Peter Sherer examined pay differen-
tials between white and black players in 
the National Basketball Association (NBA) 
during the 1985-86 season.  In 1985-86, 
about 75 percent of players were black, and, 
on average, black players earned almost 3 
percent more than white players.  In fact, 
the only three players during that season 
who earned more than $2 million were 
black (Magic Johnson, Moses Malone and 
Kareem Abdul-Jabbar).  Also, white players 
tended to play in cities with lower popula-
tion, a higher white share of population 
and higher home-game attendance.
Kahn and Sherer reached a different 
conclusion regarding pay differentials 
after controlling for players’ performance 
statistics (e.g., points, minutes per game 
and number of seasons played), team char-
acteristics (winning percentage and home 
attendance) and some local demographics 
(total population and the percentage black, 
and per capita income).  White players 
earned about 20 percent more than black 
players, all else equal, in the mid-1980s.   
In addition, the authors found that a white 
player with the same performance level 
as a black player would bring in a total of 
8,000 to 13,000 more fans at home games, 
which they estimated was an extra $80,000 
to $130,000 in revenue.  The authors 
argued that their results reflect customer 
discrimination (rather than employer or 
co-worker discrimination) because fans 
appeared to be willing to pay a premium  
to watch white players.
Economist Barton Hamilton studied 
whether this “white premium” contin-
ued into the 1990s by examining salaries 
during the 1994-95 NBA season.  For this 
season, the average black player earned 
about 17 percent more than the average 
white player, and nine of the 10 highest-
paid players were black.  Like Kahn and 
Sherer, Hamilton controlled for players’ 
performance, team characteristics and 
local demographics to determine the true 
impact of race on a player’s salary.  Unlike 
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1 However, head coaches have a higher average 
turnover rate (22 percent) than CEOs  
(10 percent).
 
2 In the MLB, players are not eligible for free 
agency, which allows them to negotiate a 
contract with multiple teams, until they have 
six years of major league service.  Players with 
three, four or five years of major league ser-
vice are eligible for salary arbitration.  Under 
salary arbitration, the player and the team 
each submit a final offer, and an arbitrator 
must choose one of them.  See Kahn (1993).
 
3 One conclusion that Price and Wolfers 
drew is that a potential bias by the referees 
for their own race exists.  They argued that 
because NBA referees are heavily scrutinized 
after each of their games, it is most likely an 
unconscious bias.
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the previous authors, he found no signifi-
cant pay differential between the average 
white and black player.  However, among the 
stars and the superstars (i.e., those players 
in the top 25 percent and top 10 percent 
of the salary distribution, respectively), 
whites earned about 18 percent more 
than blacks.  Because the stars are 
the most visible players on a team, 
Hamilton argued that this pay differ-
ential continued to reflect customer 
discrimination.
Discrimination in Play
Economists Joseph Price and Justin 
Wolfers performed a different evalua-
tion of discrimination in the NBA.  They 
estimated the amount of racial bias from 
referees when calling fouls on players of 
the opposite race, which can influence the 
on-court performance of the players.  They 
examined every NBA game from the 1991-
92 to the 2003-04 seasons and obtained 
statistics for each player and the race of the 
(randomly assigned) three referees for every 
game.  The economists were able to com-
pare the number of personal fouls a player 
received depending on the racial composi-
tion of the officiating crew.  
About one-third of the referees during 
this time period were black, and black play-
ers accounted for over 80 percent of total 
minutes played.  At first glance, the data 
showed that black players had more playing 
time and fewer fouls per 48 minutes played 
(the “foul rate”) than white players.  More-
over, players had slightly lower foul rates 
when the officiating crew was of the same 
race, on average.  A more in-depth analysis 
with controls for various characteristics 
(e.g., player position, height, weight, all-star 
status) showed that the foul rate for black 
players increased by about 4 percent when 
all three referees were white rather than 
black.  As a consequence, playing time and 
points scored decreased slightly.  Overall, 
the authors found that 62 percent of the 
black referees appeared to have a pro-black 
bias (by calling fewer fouls on black play-
ers), while 78 percent of the white referees 
appeared to have a pro-white bias (by call-
ing more fouls on black players).  
With these impacts on individual players, 
the authors tested the effect that this appar-
ent referee bias had on the most important 
outcome: winning.  During the sample 
period, the margin of victory was one point 
in 4 percent of the games; thus, the seem-
ingly small referee bias could have a large 
effect on the overall outcome.  Indeed, Price 
and Wolfers argued that changing the racial 
composition of the referees to match that 
of the players on the team would lead to an 
increase in winning percentage for the team 
with more time played by black players from 
48.6 percent to 50.5 percent.
3
not Just fun and Games
Because economists do not generally 
have the opportunity to conduct laboratory 
experiments, sports provide an excellent 
opportunity to test theories, ranging from 
the existence of discrimination in the labor 
market to whether firms or individuals 
optimize their behavior to achieve a certain 
goal.  With the high level of data availability 
that sports provides, undoubtedly there will 
be more natural experiments to analyze. 
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